Written by Dr. John A. Sparks

Among recent actions by the U.S. Supreme Court, a four-sentence order may set the stage for the court to eventually address the collision between free speech and religious freedom on one hand and gay rights on the other. The order voided a judgment by the state of Oregon that had imposed a $135,000 fine on Portland-area bakery owners—the Kleins—for refusing to bake a wedding cake for a lesbian couple. Oregon maintained that its anti-discrimination law condemned such a rebuff even when the bakery owners’ religious convictions run counter to participating in a same-sex wedding.

Besides vacating the fine, the court sent the case back to the Oregon Court of Appeals to be reconsidered in light of the Masterpiece Cakeshop decision. Masterpiece involved a similar situation in Colorado for Christian baker, Jack Phillips, when he refused, on religious grounds, to bake a wedding cake for a gay couple’s marriage. In Masterpiece, Colorado’s case against Phillips had relied on language in an earlier case, Employment Division v. Smith (1990), which said that religious liberty claims could not be used as a defense against “generally applicable” laws that were “neutrally” enforced. However, the U.S. Supreme Court found that the Colorado proceedings against Phillips were far from “neutral.” In fact, they were rife with religious hostility toward him. Besides that, the court found that Colorado had selectively enforced its anti-discrimination laws, making them less than “generally applicable.”  Now the court is ordering the Oregon court to review the Klein case looking for the same examples of unfairness it had discovered in Masterpiece.

Klein is the second case of this type that the U.S. Supreme Court has sent back to the courts below for reconsideration in light of the Masterpiece decision. Earlier, the Washington Supreme Court was ordered to make such a review in a case involving a florist, Barronelle Stutzman, and her business, Arlene Flowers. Stutzman had refused to provide wedding flowers for a gay couple’s ceremony. Just recently (June 6, 2019), the Washington court found that proceedings were not conducted with “religious animus.” The Washington court closed that review by repeating its conclusions that neither free speech, free exercise, nor freedom of expression were infringed upon by the anti-discrimination law in question.

It seems likely that the Oregon court will make similar findings of the absence of religious hostility. Once the Oregon court has spoken on the matter in the way it is expected to rule, the questions of religiously hostile proceedings and selective enforcement will have been disposed of. That will leave the central constitutional questions of free speech and free exercise of religion for the U.S. Supreme Court to face which it effectively avoided in Masterpiece. The arguments on those issues made by the Kleins and Mrs. Stutzman in their existing court filings will be brought up again.

What are the Constitutional claims supporting the positions of faith-guided commercial providers who are asked to set aside their religious beliefs by customers who ask them to offer services contrary to their convictions?

The first basis for relief from the reach of the anti-discrimination laws is the claim that such laws violate the freedom of speech of the providers. At first blush, it may seem a stretch to regard baking a cake or arranging flowers as “speech.” However, federal Constitutional cases have long recognized that protecting speech is not limited to “the spoken or written word.” Engaging in conduct that expresses a point of view or idea is speech, and that expressive conduct is protected by the First Amendment.

In addition, and important for these cases, citizens cannot be forced to deliver a message provided by the government or another person. The oldest and best-known case recognizing this idea—called the “compelled speech doctrine”—is W. Va. State Board of Education v. Barnett. There the court said that public school children could not be required to salute the American flag or say the pledge of allegiance when to do so was against their religion’s teaching. The case, though it involved religious convictions, is usually viewed as a free speech case in which the court forbade the government from making citizens express a message contrary to their beliefs. Both wedding providers—the Kleins and Stutzman—maintain that Washington and Oregon laws are, in effect, requiring them to use their artistic expression to further a conjugal union against which they have serious religious reservations, or face a legal penalty. When their only other choice is to abandon the means to make a livelihood that they have chosen, the burden placed upon them is unconstitutional.

The second constitutional claim asserted by the two wedding providers is that their religious liberty under the Free Exercise clause of the First Amendment has been denied to them by the anti-discrimination laws. Employment Division v. Smith, as already mentioned above, makes that claim more difficult. The Smith defendants consumed an illegal drug—peyote—as part of a Native American religious ceremony. They were dismissed from their jobs with a drug rehabilitation organization and lost a claim for unemployment compensation. They argued that their free exercise of religion was being infringed upon by Oregon.

The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed, maintaining that “neutral” and “generally applicable” regulations could not be avoided by religious liberty claims. The result was probably right: religious ceremonies do not give participants the right to use controlled substances. But, unfortunately, the court’s opinion needlessly swept away an almost three-decades-old case which had established a sensible legal formula for addressing those instances in which religious convictions clash with existing legislation. That formula, called the Sherbert test after Sherbert v. Verner (1963), protected religious believers when the court found that a law or regulation “substantially burdened” their “free exercise of religion,” and that the government had no “compelling interest” at stake, or that it overlooked a “less restrictive” way to further its interest. Congress vigorously sought to counter the Smith decision by passing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), which required the restoration of the Sherbert test. However, the RFRA was ruled as only applicable to federal laws and regulations and not to the states and therefore does not help the Kleins and Stutzman.

Given the clear facts of these cases, and the uncertainty that remains for religious providers, it is high time for the court to hear and decide them. For the most part, the reasoning of Smith should be discarded and Sherbert reinstated. The court should not avoid these fundamental questions of free speech and free exercise of religion any longer. Rather, it must courageously set the cases for oral argument and address these key issues head on.

This article was originally published by The Institute for Faith & Freedom.

It has been an eventful term for the U.S. Supreme Court, which has provided many closely decided cases and ended with the retirement of Justice Anthony Kennedy. For those interested in free speech and religious liberty, there have been plenty of decisions to keep track of and digest. Here is what you need to know.

Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission

The story is well-known. Jack Phillips, a Christian cake shop owner from Colorado, refused to create a cake for the same-sex “wedding” of two men. They filed a complaint with the Colorado Civil Rights Commission, which held that Mr. Phillips violated the state’s public accommodation laws. Much of the litigation centered around whether creating a wedding cake fell under the free expression protections of the First Amendment, but the Court punted on this argument, leaving it for a future case. Instead, the Court ruled for Mr. Phillips on two separate grounds.

First, the Commission did not employ religiously neutral standards when deciding Mr. Phillips case, and instead showed unwarranted hostility towards his Christian faith. One official on the Commission even referred to Mr. Phillips’ faith as “one of the most despicable pieces of rhetoric that people can use.”

Second, the Court found that the Commission had used different standards for different bakery owners. An individual named Bill Jack (no relation to Jack Phillips) went to several bakeries asking them to create a cake with a message critical of homosexuality derived from the Bible and was—unsurprisingly—refused service. When complaints were filed, the Commission found that bakeries can refuse to make a cake with a message they deem to be derogatory.

The popular narrative is that this case was decided on narrow grounds and sets little precedent for future cases. However, Masterpiece has already proven to be more influential than that narrative suggests. Anti-religious animus by government officials is common in religious liberty cases, and there’s no better example than Arlene’s Flowers.

Arlene’s Flowers Inc. v. Washington

Similar to Jack Phillips, Barronelle Stutzman, a Washington florist, refused to offer her services for a same-sex wedding. However, in this case, when she refused to create a floral arrangement for a same-sex couple, it was not the couple who took action. Rather, the state’s attorney general, on his own initiative, filed a complaint against Ms. Stutzman, showing unusual hostility towards her religious beliefs. This led to the Washington Supreme Court holding that Ms. Stutzman engaged in unlawful discrimination. However, the U.S. Supreme Court vacated the decision and remanded it back to the state supreme court to consider the decision in light of Masterpiece.

National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra

This case had less headline appeal than Masterpiece but will likely end up being the more influential in First Amendment jurisprudence. The Court found that California’s Reproductive FACT Act, which forced pro-life pregnancy centers to post disclosures about the state’s abortion services, to be a violation of the pregnancy centers’ free speech rights. The decision was important on several fronts. Most notably, the Court refused to create a lesser standard of First Amendment protection for “professional speech.” The argument was that the state should be given greater power to prevent and compel the speech of professionals (like doctors, lawyers, and mental health counselors) than the usual First Amendment protections would allow. But Justice Clarence Thomas, writing for the majority, criticized such “professional speech” doctrine as being a tool to suppress unpopular ideas or information. The decision may open possible litigation on the issue of so-called reparative therapy bans, which ban professional counselors from talking with minors about their unwanted same-sex sexual attraction.

In his concurrence, Justice Kennedy came down particularly hard on California for its intolerance of the pro-life viewpoint:

The California Legislature included in its official history the congratulatory statement that the Act was part of California’s legacy of “forward thinking.” But it is not forward thinking to force individuals to “be an instrument for fostering public adherence to an ideological point of view [they] fin[d] unacceptable.” It is forward thinking to begin by reading the First Amendment as ratified in 1791; to understand the history of authoritarian government as the Founders then knew it; to confirm that history since then shows how relentless authoritarian regimes are in their attempts to stifle free speech; and to carry those lessons onward as we seek to preserve and teach the necessity of freedom of speech for the generations to come.

Trump v. Hawaii

This case stems from then-presidential candidate Donald Trump’s promise of a “Muslim ban” during the 2016 presidential campaign. Initially, President Trump signed an order that banned entry in the U.S. from seven predominantly Muslim countries regardless of visa status. However, after getting blocked by the lower courts because of its disproportionate effect on Muslims and because of several anti-Muslim statements from the Trump administration, the president issued a moderated version of the order. This time, the order did not outright ban travel from the seven countries but it did add extra scrutiny before people were allowed to enter the U.S. The final order was also backed by evidence that the nations with restricted access posed legitimate national security risks and were not just chosen based on anti-Muslim animus.

Chief Justice John Roberts pointed out that although five of the seven countries with restricted access were predominantly Muslim, the countries made up only 8% of the world’s Muslim population and were previously designated as posing national security risks. The decision continues the longstanding judicial deference to the Executive Branch on decisions affecting national security. The High Court also renounced the infamous Korematsu v. United States decision, which allowed the executive branch to establish internment camps for Japanese Americans during World War II.

Janus v. AFSCME

This case is not just of interest for its First Amendment jurisprudence but also its close connection to Illinois politics. Illinois was one of the 22 states that allowed unions to charge nonmembers fees for the costs of collective bargaining with employers. Mark Janus, a government social worker from Springfield, filed suit against Illinois arguing that the government requiring him to pay a private organization like a union violated his First Amendment right to free speech and association. By subsidizing the union’s administrative costs, Janus argued that he was being forced by the government to support the union’s political activism. The U.S. Supreme Court agreed in a 5-4 decision. Justice Samuel Alito wrote that the law “violates the free speech rights of nonmembers by compelling them to subsidize private speech on matters of substantial public concern” like tax increases or collective bargaining rights. One important distinction is that this ruling only applies to public sector unions, not to any in the private sector.

Rowan County v. Lund

One notable case that did not get the U.S. Supreme Court review comes from Rowan County, North Carolina, where the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal barred the opening prayer at county board meetings. The prayer was led by the elected commissioners, who took turns leading at each meeting. Three residents were offended by the prayers and sued the county. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals struck down the prayer policy as violating the Establishment Clause despite clear precedent from the U.S. Supreme Court allowing public prayers in Town of Greece v. Galloway. Unfortunately, the High Court denied cert (i.e., declined to review the lower court decision) on the county’s appeal, and the Fourth Circuit’s decision stands.

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